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AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 GENEVA 6426

VIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL MBFR

ALSO POUCHED TO: ALL CSCE CAPITALS, LISBON, NICOSIA, OSLO,
SOFIA, USLOSACLANT, USNMR SHAPE & USCINCEUR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE REVIEW: PART III-MILITARY ASPECTS

SUMMARY: A WIDE VARIETY OF PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN
AIRE IN THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON MILITARY SECURITY BUT
ITS DELIBERATIONS OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS HAVE LEFT
IMPRESSION THAT IT IS UNLIKELY TO REACH CONSENSUS
ON ANYTHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN TWO CBM'S: PRIOR
NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS AND EXCHANGE
OF OBSERVERS. THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES HAVE MADE
CLEAR THAT ANY OTHER CONCRETE MEASURES WOULD BE
UNACCEPTABLE AND THEY ARE SEEKING TO MINIMIZE THE
CONTENT OF EVEN THESE TWO. OUR NATO ALLIES, PLUS THE
NEUTRALS, WANT TO MAXIMIZE THEIR CONTENT AND THE TWO
OPPOSING GROUPS HAVE BECOME ENMESHED IN DISCUSSION OF
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SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE CBM'S THAT THEY HOPE TO PIN

DOWN. THEIR VIEWS REMAIN FAR APART. WHEN DRAFTING BEGINS AFTER THE HOLIDAY RECESS, HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE SOME EASING OF THE SOVIET STANCE OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS. WE SHOULD PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES IN WHICH THE POSITIONS OF THE SOVIETS AND OUR NATO ALLIES (PLUS THE NEUTRALS) DRAW TOGETHER ON SPECIFIC FEATURES WE HAD HOPED TO LEAVE UNDEFINED, THEREBY RAISING THE RISK OF U.S. ISOLATION OF SUCH POINTS. WE SHOULD ALSO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS REMAIN OBDURATE OVER ISSUES ON WHICH OUR ALLIES FEEL THEY NEED AND DESERVE MORE U.S. SUPPORT THAN OUR CURRENT POLICIES ALLOW. END SUMMARY.

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

(B) THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO MEASURES BEYOND THESE TWO CBM'S AND, MOREOVER, THAT IT WANTS TO MINIMIZE THEIR CONTENT. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT FORECLOSED THEIR OPTIONS FOR MAKING SMALL CONCESSIONS ON SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES CONCERNING THE TWO CBM'S, THEY HAVE SHOWN NO SIGNS OF MOVING FROM THEIR MINIMALIST APPROACH AND HAVE INDICATED AN UNDERLYING SUSPICION THAT THE WEST

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HAS ULTERIOR MOTIVES IN PURSUING CBM'S. THE SOVIET POSITION HAS BEEN FULLY SUPPORTED BY THEIR ALLIES-- WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF THE ROMANIANS.

(C) THE ROMANIAN DELEGATION HAS JOINT, AND IN MANY CASES OUT-DISTANCED, THE NEUTRAL DELEGATIONS IN PRESSING FOR THE MOST FAR-REACHING MEASURES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE CBM FILED. SOVIET OBDURACY, HOWEVER,

HAS TENDED TO DISPIRIT THESE DELEGATIONS AND CAUSED THEM TO LOWER THEIR SIGHTS, BUT THEIR CONSEQUENT SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND GRIEVENCE REMAINS TO BE COPEDED WITH IN REACHING A FUTURE CONSENSUS TO CBM'S.

(D) SOME OF OUR NATO ALLIES HAVE GIVEN QUALIFIED SUPPORT TO CERTAIN OF THE MORE FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS MADE BY THE NEUGRALS BUT THE ALLIES HAVE CONCENTRATED ON ACHIEVING THE MAXIMUM SUBSTANCE FOR THE TWO CBM'S CITED ABOVE. THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT SUCH AN ACHIEVEMENT IS VITAL FOR THE PROMOTION OF DETENTE IN EUROPE AND THAT IT MUST BE EXTRACTED FROM THE SOVIETS AS PART OF THE PRICE PAID FOR WHAT THE USSR OBTAINS FROM THIS CONFERENCE. OUR ALLIES WANT MAXIMUM U.S. SUPPORT FOR THESE OBJECTIVES AND FEEL FRUSTRATED BY ITS ABSENCE.

(E) IN CAUCUSES OF NATO SUB-COMMITTEE MEMBERS, WE HAVE KEPT OUR ALLIES MINDFUL OF THE USG'S LIMITED GOALS ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF CSCE AND OF THE CONSIDERATIONS (SUCH AS THOSE CONCERNING MBFR) WHICH GOVERN OUR RESTRAINED ATTITUDE TOWARDS THESE ASPECTS. BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT WITH OUR ALLIES, WE WE HAVE LET THE SOVIETS BEAR THE ONUS FOR REJECTING MEASURES GOING BEYOND THE TWO BASIC CBM'S BY REFRAINING OURSELVES FROM OPENLY EXPRESSING U.S. OPPOSITION TO SUCH MEASURES. AT THE REQUEST OF THE ALLIED DELEGATIONS, WE HAVE ALSO REMAINED SILENT WHILE THEY PRESSED THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE AN ADDITIONAL CBM, PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS, WHICH BOTH WE AND THE SOVIETS ARE ONLY PREPARED TO "STUDY." THE ALLIES HOPE THE USSR WILL ULTIMATELY AGREE TO MAKE THE OTHER TWO CBM'S MORE SUBSTANTIAL IN RETURN FOR THEIR DROPPING THE MOVEMENTS ISSUE. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO

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FOCUS ATTENTION OF THE CBM'S ALONE AND HAVE CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT A CONFERENCE OF THIS SIZE AND DIVERSITY COULD, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, ACHIEVE DRAMATIC RESULTS.

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2. ISSUES. (A) DISCUSSIONS ON CBM'S HAVE FOCUSED ON NUMEROUS SPECIFIC ISSUES WHICH ARE LISTED BELOW TOGETHER WITH A SUMMARY INDICATION OF SOVIET, NEUTRAL AND OUR NATO ALLIES' POSITIONS ON THEM. (PRESENT U.S. POSITIONS ARE REVIEWED UNDER PART 3). ALSO LISTED ARE SEVERAL SUB-COMMITTEE ISSUES FALLING OUTSIDE THE CBM AREA, MOST OF WHICH INVOLVE PROPOSALS MADE BY INDIVIDUAL NEUTRAL DELEGATIONS.

B. FORM OF FINAL DOCUMENT COVERING CBM'S. SOVIETS HAVE TABLED DRAFT FORMULATIONS ON CBM'S AS A SECTION OF THEIR PROPOSED OVER-ALL GENERAL DECLARATION FOR CSCE BUT HAVE REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING ON QUESTION OF SEPARATE CBM DOCUMENT. MANY OF OUR NATO ALLIES AND NEUTRALS ARE KNOWN TO FAVOR SEPARATE DOCUMENT BUT HAVE NOT YET EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS AT SUB-COMMITTEE MEETINGS.

(C) NATURE OF CBM OBLIGATION. IN SOVIET DRAFT DECLARATION, PARTICIPATING STATES "DEEM IT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE" THAT STATES CONCERNED "SHOULD" GIVE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS IN ADVANCE, BUT SOVIET SUB-COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL

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REPS HAVE LEFT ISSUE OPEN AND INVITED OTHERS' VIEWS ON NATURE OF OBLIGATION. MOST NEUTRALS AND OUR NATO ALLIES FAVOR VOLUNTARY, NON-TREATY-TYPE OBLIGATION THAT WOULD SOMEHOW BE "MORALLY AND POLITICALLY BINDING" (GENEVA 5599) AND WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS OR

VERIFICATION.

(D) SCOPE OF CBM'S. SOVIET INSISTING ON LIMITING CBM'S TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS AND EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MANEUVERS. OUR NATO ALLIES HAVE SOUGHT, WITHOUT MUCH HOPE OF SUCCESS, TO INCLUDE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AS WELL. NEUGRALS ALSO WANT TO INCLUDE MOVEMENTS; SPANISH, SWEDES AND ROMANIANS HAVE IN ADDITION MADE PROPOSALS FOR OTHER CBM'S (GENEVA 5172, 5839, 5217) WHICH SOVIETS HAVE SAID ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

(E) DEFINITION OF "MANEUVER." SOVIETS HAVE EXPRESSED POSITIVE INTEREST IN SWEDISH DEFINITION OF MANEUVER AS "TRAINING WITH WAR-ORGANIZED UNITS UNDER WAR-LIKE CONDITIONS" (GENEVA 5401). OUR NATO ALLIES HAVE INDICATED THEY FELT IT WAS PREMATURE TO TRY TO AGREE ON DEFINITION, THE UNDERLYING REASON BEING THAT TO DO SO WOULD FORCE A SEPARATE DEFINITION OF MOVEMENTS.

(F) SIZE AND MAKE-UP OF MANEUVER SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION. SOVIETS FAVOR NOTIFICATION ONLY OF MILIT-DIVISIONAL MANEUVERS INVOLVING GROUND FORCES WITH OR WITH PARTICIPATION OF AIR OR NAVAL UNITS (GENEVA 5579, 5841). NEUTRALS AND NATO ALLIES FAVOR SETTING NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AT DIVISIONAL LEVEL (AND IN SOME CASES AT BRIGADE LEVEL) AND SOME FAVOR INCLUDING PURELY NAVAL OR AIR MANEUVERS. NORWAY AND TURKEY ARE ADAMANT IN INCLUDING REFERENCE TO AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE FORCES.

(G) LOCATION OF MANEUVER SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION. IN ORDER TO LIMIT USSR TERRITORY COVERED, SOVIETS FAVOR GIVING NOTIFICATION ONLY OF THOSE MANEUVERS TAKING PLACE IN "FRONTIER ZONES" (GENEVA 5579, 5841). NATO ALLIES AND NEUTRALS HAVE OPPOSED THIS CRITERION, CONFIDENTIAL

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HAVE ARGUED THAT MANEUVERS ANYWHERE IN EUROPE SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AND SOME HAVE FAVORED INCLUDING ADJACENT WATERS AS WELL.

(H) TIMING OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION. SOVIETS ADVOCATE 5 OR 6 DAYS' NOTICE (GENEVA 5579). A NUMBER OF NATO ALLIES HAVE CALLED TO 60 DAYS' NOTICE; MANY NEUTRALS FAVOR 30 TO 60 DAYS.

(I) CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. SOVIETS HAVE CRITICIZED DETAILED CONTENT CALLED FOR IN NORWEGIAN AND U.K. PROPOSALS (TEXTS: USNATO 4491; CSCE STAGE I DOC 18) AND HAVE

INSTEAD FAVORED SHORTER LESS DETAILED FORMAT PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVS (GENEVA 5596), WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE UNIT DESIGNATION, DESCRIPTION OF FORCES INVOLVED, OR POINTS OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION.

(J) DISSEMINATION OF NOTIFICATION. IN CASE OF NATIONAL MANEUVERS, SOVIETS FAVOR GIVING NOTIFICATION ONLY TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OPPOSITE THE FRONTIER ZONE WHERE THE MANEUVER TAKES PLACE, THUS INSURING SOVIETS WOULD NOTIFY VERY FEW MANEUVERS TO WEST. IN CASE OF MULTI-NATIONAL MANEUVERS, THEY WOULD HAVE COUNTRY ON WHOSE TERRITORY MANEUVER TAKING PLACE GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS THROUGH BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, POSSIBLY SUPPLEMENTED BY CENTRALIZED NOTIFICATION SYSTEM USING A CSCE FOLLOW-ON BODY (GENEVA 5579). MANY NEUTRALS AND NATO ALLIES HAVE SPOKEN IN FAVOR OF GIVING ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS NOTIFICATION OF BOTH NATIONAL MULTINATIONAL MANEUVERS VIA BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

(K) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MANEUVERS. SOVIETS AND ALL NEUTRALS AND NATO ALLIES WHO HAVE ADDRESSED SUBJECT HAVE FAVORED EXCHANGING OBSERVERS ON INVITATIONAL, NOT AUTOMATIC BASIS. SOVIETS ENVISAGE VERY LIMITED EXCHANGES LEAVING MODALITIES UP TO HOST (GENEVA 5954); NATO ALLIES AND NEUTRALS HAVE NOT COMMENTED ON MODALITIES IN DETAIL.

(L) OTHER ISSUES. THE ROMANIANS (GENEVA 5134, 5217)
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AND YUGOSLOVS (GENEVA 5216) HAVE INTRODUCED ELABORATE PROPOSALS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT WHICH SOVIETS AND SOME NATO ALLIES HAVE INDICATED ARE NEITHER APPROPRIATE FOR CSCE NOR ACCEPTABLE. SWEDES, HOWEVER, HAVE PROPOSED THAT CSCE SHOULD ENDEAVOR AT LEAST TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER MILITARY SECURITY MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND SOME NATO ALLIES HAVE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER PREAMBULAR-TYPE FORMULATIONS ALONG THESE LINES IN A CBM DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO SOAK UP YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN PRESSURES. THE FINNS HAVE INTRODUCED A TEN-YEAR-OLD PROPOSAL FOR A NORDIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, BUT IT HAS ATTRACTED ALMOST NO INTEREST (GENEVA A-599). SEVERAL NEUTRALS HAVE ALSO RAISED ISSUE OF HAVING CSCE ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF "UNDIMINISHED SECURITY" IN CONNECTION WITH THE MBFR TALKS (GENEVA 6124) AND HAVE SOUGHT MEANS TO REGISTER THEIR VIEWS AT THE VIENNA TALKS (GENEVA 5771).

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3. LIKELY OUTCOME: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS

(A) WHEN THE PERIOD OF DRAFTING AND HARD BARGAINING BEGINS FOLLOWING THE CHRISTMAS RECESS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE LIMITED CONCESSIONS TO THE NEUTRALS AND OUR NATO ALLIES ON SOME ISSUES. U.S. WILL HAVE TO BE ON THE ALERT AGAINST SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS AND OUR ALLIES (PLUS THE NEUTRALS) MOVE TOWARD COMPROMISES ON SPECIFICS OR DEFINITIONS THAT WE HAVE WANTED TO AVOID AND WHICH MIGHT PUT US IN AN ISOLATED POSITION. WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE ON THE ALERT AGAINST A STATEMATE--UN UNBRIDGEABLE GAP--BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND OUR NATO ALLIES OVER ISSUES ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE, UNDER EXISTING USG POLICIES, TO SUPPORT OUR ALLIES. IN SUCH SITUATIONS WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY RISK POLITICAL COSTS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES FOR FAILING TO GIVE THEM THE BACKING WHICH THEY WOULD FEEL MIGHT BE DECISIVE VIA-A-VIS THE SOVIETS.

(B) IF AND WHEN SUCH SITUATIONS DEVELOPS, WE WILL OF COURSE HAVE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAKE IN LIGHT OF
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THE TACTICAL SITUATION AT THE TIME. NONETHELESS, FOR THE PURPOSES OF GENERAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WE THINK IT DESIRABLE THAT ATTENTION NOW BE GIVEN TO SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WE MAY HAVE TO FACE. TO FACILITATE THIS, WE HAVE SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING LIST OUR ESTIMATE OF LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS AT THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON MAJOR ISSUES TOGETHER WITH A SUMMARY INDICATION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE USG FOR DEALING WITH THEM.

(C) FORM OF FINAL DOCUMENT GOVERNING CBM'S. WE ANTICIPATE CONTINUED SOVIET PRESSURE FOR INCLUSION OF CBM'S IN COMMON DOCUMENT WITH PRINCIPLES GUIDING INTERSTATE RELATIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE SOVIETS WILL AGREE TO A SEPARATE DOCUMENT AS DESIRED BY NATO ALLIES. AT NATO, U.S. HAS TAKEN POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD SEPARATE DOCUMENT OF TYPE DRAFTED BY FRG (STATE 162304) AND WE SHOULD BE PREPARED SUPPORT OUR ALLIES WHEN ISSUE COMES TO A HEAD.

(D) NATURE OF CBM OBLIGATION. SUB-COMMITTEE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY AGREE THAT OBLIGATION MUST BE VOLUNTARY BUT THERE WILL BE DIFFERENCES AMONG NATO DELS, AND WITH NEUTRALS AND SOVIETS, ARISING FROM EFFORTS MAKE CBM'S "MORALLY AND POLITICALLY BINDING." CURRENTLY USG POSITION THAT CBM'S MUST BE VOLUNTARY AND THAT THEIR ACCEPTANCE INVOLVES SOME DEGREE OF MORAL AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO CARRY THEM OUT (STATE 211308) IS LIKELY TO REMAIN TENABLE.

(E) SCOPE OF CBM'S. OUR ALLIES WILL WANT TO CONTINUE WELL INTO THE DRAFTING PERIOD TO PRESS FOR INCLUSION OF MOVEMENTS, HOPING THAT THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN POSITIONS MIGHT CHANGE OR THAT AT LEAST THE USSR AND U.S. WILL PLACATE THEM BY MAKING THE OTHER CBM'S MORE SUBSTANTIAL. IN THE MEANWHILE, OUR ALIES WILL WANT THE U.S. TO CONTINUE TO AVOID OPENLY EXPRESSING ITS OPPOSITION TO INCLUDING MOVEMENTS. WE SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING A STRONG EFFORT TO IMPRESS UPON OUR ALLIES, AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS, THAT WHEN DRAFTING BEGINS WE WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THEM EFFECTIVELY ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES ONLY BY PLAYING A LESS PASSIVE ROLE AT THE SUB-COMMITTEE AND THAT THIS WILL INESCAPEABLY BRING TO LIGHT OUR
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UNWILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE MOVEMENTS. WE MIGHT TELL OUR ALLIES THAT WE FEEL IT IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO HAVE THIS HAPPEN IN A MANNER WHICH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AVOIDS

DRAMATIZING OUR DIFFERENCES AND THAT WE THEREFORE HOPE THEY WILL BE ABLE AT LEAST TO TACITLY DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING MOVEMENTS.

(F) DEFINITION OF MANEUVER. DEFINITION FAVORED BY SOVIETS MAY PICK UP NEUTRAL SUPPORT AND ATTRACT SOME ANTO ALLIES. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SEEK SUPPORT FOR DEFINITION COMPATIBLE WITH EVENTUAL MBFR DEFINITION (VIENNA 9601) OR, AS U.S. HAS PREFERRED, TO FAVOR AVOIDING DEFINITION IF CONSENSUS OTHERWISE UNATTAINABLE.

(G) SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF MANEUVER SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION. SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO HOLD TO THEIR POSITION ON SIZE. WE SHOULD CONSIDER GIVING ALLIES STRONG BACKING FOR SETTING THREASHOLD AT ONE DIVISION AS FAR AS GROUND FORCES ARE CONCERNED. ALTERNATIVELY, WE MIGHT OPT IN FAVOR OF AVOIDING SPECIFICATION OF SIZE AND COMPOSITION IN LINE WITH CURRENT U.S. DESIRE TO TRY TO AVOID SPECIFICS. ALLIES THEMSELVES ARE STILL DIVIDED ON COMPOSITION QUESTION.

(H) LOCATION OF MANEUVER SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION. SOVIETS MAY ATTEMPT TO DELIMIT FRONTIER AREAS IN MANNER DESIGNED TO OVERCOME OBJECTIONS OF NEUTRALS AND NATO ALLIES BUT WE ESTIMATE SUCH EFFORT WOULD FALL FAR SHORT OF ACHIEVING CONSENSUS. IN CONFORMITY WITH OUR OWN AVERSION TO "ZONES", WE SHOULD CONSIDER TAKING STRONG POSITION AGAINST ZONE CONCEPT IN SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES. IN SO DOING, WE MIGHT AVOID PITFALLS OF TRYING TO DEFINE BROADER LIMITS OF EUROPEAN TERRITORY AND ADJACENT WATERS THROUGH USE OF SOME GENERAL CONCEPT. WE MUST ALSO ANTICIPATE RENEWED MALTESE INSISTENCE FOR INCLUDING REFERENCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA WHICH U.S. OPPOSES.

(I) TIME OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION. WE SHOULD PLAN TO SUPPORT POSITION OF OUR ALLIES AND NEUTRALS THAT 5-6 DAYS NOTIFICATION PROPOSED BY SOVIETS IN UNACCEPTABLE. CONFIDENTIAL

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BEARING IN MIND RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. POSITIONS AT MBFR (VIENNA 9601), WE SHOULD CONSIDER ALSO SUPPORTING OUR ALLIES IN FAVOR OF 60 DAYS NOTIFICATION OR, PARTICULARLY IN CASE OF STATEMATE, WE MIGHT OPT FOR AN IMPRECISE FORMULATION SUCH AS "REASONABLE TIME IN ADVANCE" WHICH WOULD MEET CURRENT U.S. PREFERENCE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOVIETS MAY INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO PERIOD LONGER THAN 5-6 DAYS, POSSIBLY SEVERAL WEEKS, AND THEREBY REACH COMPROMISE WITH NEUTRALS. IF SO, IT COULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN NATO SOLIDARITY BEHIND 60 DAYS.

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(J) CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.

SUB-COMMITTEE MAY BE ABLE TO REACH CONSENSUS BASED
ON COMPROMISE BETWEEN YUGOSLAV AND NATO ALLIES' PROPOSALS.
WE SHOULD CONSIDER USE OF PART OF ILLUSTRATIVE LIST AS
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.

(K) DISSEMINATION OF NOTIFICATION. SOVIETS WILL
PROBABLY AGREE WITH POSITIONS TAKEN BY NEUTRALS AND
NATO ALLIES, WHICH WE SHARE, IN FAVOR OF NOTIFICATION
THROUGH BILATERAL, DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. WE SHOULD BE
PREPARED TO SPEAK AGAINST USE OF ANY FOLLOW-ON BODY
FOR THIS PURPOSE.

(L) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS: CONSENSUS IS ALMOST CERTAIN
ON ISSUE OF PUTTING EXCHANGES OF DISCRETIONARY
INVITATIONAL BASIS. U.S. AND ALLIED POSITIONS ON
MODALITIES STILL NEED TO BE ELABORATED.

(M) OTHER PROPOSALS. WE THINK IT LIKELY THAT THE
NEUTRALS WILL ACCEPT, AFTER PROLONGED DEBATE, THE
FACE-SAVING DEVICE OF INCLUDING SEVERAL PREAMBULAR

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PARAGRAPHS CONTAINING SOME POLITE, GENERALIZED REFERENCES TO CERTAIN OF THEIR PET IDEAS. THESE MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF EXPRESSING HOPES FOR FURTHER PROGRESS AND REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE TYPES OF FORMULATIONS THE USG WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT; E.G., THOSE DRAWN FROM THE PREAMBLES OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES TO WHICH U.S. IS NOW A PARTY. THE LIKEHOOD OF SATISFYING THE NEUTRAL IN THIS FASHION WOULD BE INCREASED BY THE ADDITION OF A STATEMENT ON "SELF RESTRAINT" SUCH AS THE U.K. HAS PUT FORWARD AT NATO (USNATO 5683). WE BELIEVE THAT NEUTRALS' DESIRE TO BE PLUGGED INTO THE MBFR TALKS CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY HANDLED WITH THE COOPERATION OF OUR ALLIES ON THE BASIS OF THE NATO-APPROVED GUIDELINES (USNATO 5260) WHICH PROVIDED FOR KEEPING THE NEUTRALS INFORMED WHILE AVOIDING AN IMPRESSION OF OBLIGATION ON THE CREATION OF INSTITUTIONALIZED LINKS. AS FOR POSSIBLE REFERENCES TO MBFR IN A CBM DOCUMENT, WE ESTIMATE THAT THE PRESENT USG POSITION THAT SUCH A REFERENCE SHOULD BE VERY GENERAL AND AVOID IMPLYING A PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN MBFR (STATE 184993) WILL REMAIN TENABLE AND THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE SUCCESSFULLY TO RESIST GOING BEYOND THAT LANGUAGE OF THE VIENNA COMMUNIQUE AS FAR AS THE ISSUE OF "UNDIMINISHED SECURITY" IS CONCERNED (GENEVA 6124).

(N) WE HAVE INDICATED ABOVE A NUMBER OF INSTANCES IN WHICH THE USE OF GENERALIZED FORMULATIONS MIGHT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A COMPROMISE WHEN AN OTHERWISE UNBRIDGEABLE GAP PERSISTS BETWEEN SPECIFIC, DETAILED FORMULATIONS ADVANCED BY THE SOVIETS ON THE ONE HAND AND OUR ALLIES AND THE NEUTRALS ON THE OTHER. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF AVOIDING THE PITFALLS AND DISADVANTAGES THE USG PERCEIVES IN CBM'S THAT ARE SPECIFIC AND DETAILED IN EXPRESSION. WE HAD HOPED ORIGINALLY TO USE THE ILLUSTRATIVE LIST TO POINT THE CONFERENCE IN THIS DIRECTION. AS WE HAVE REPORTED EARLIER (GENEVA 7218), WE FEEL THAT THE TABLING OF THE U.S. LIST WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AT

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THIS PRESENT STAGE IN THE SUB-COMMITTEE'S WORK WHEN

MOST DELEGATIONS ARE STILL WRESTLING OVER SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR THE CBM'S. AFTER THE CHRISTMAS RECESS, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE U.S. LIST MIGHT BE USED TO ADVANTAGE AS EXAMPLES OF WHAT NOTIFICATION MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM THE USG, AND THE INFORMATION WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE.

(O) WE DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTY OF WINNING CONSENSUS ON THE BASIS OF SUCH GENERAL FORMULATIONS. WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO PERSUADE MOST OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT SUCH GENERALITY HAD THE MERIT OF PROMOTING FLEXIBILITY AND PERMITTING THE POSSIBLE GROWTH AND ADAPTATION OF THE CBM'S IN ACCORDANCE WITH FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. WE MIGHT ARGUE THAT IT IS ONLY REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE FIRST TO GET NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS AND EXCHANGES OF OBSERVERS UNDER WAY, HOWEVER, MODESTLY, AND THEN SEE HOW THESE PRACTICES DEVELOP OVER TIME. BASSIN

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Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 DEC 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973GENEVA06426
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731241/aaaabekt.tel
Line Count: 619
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <06-Sep-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <08 MAR 2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE REVIEW: PART III-MILITARY ASPECTS SUMMARY: A WIDE VARIETY OF PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN
TAGS: PFOR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005